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Abstract
Smartphones become very critical part of our lives as
they offer advanced capabilities with PC-like functionali-
ties. They are getting widely deployed while not only be-
ing used for classical voice-centric communication. New
smartphone malwares keep emerging where most of them
still target Symbian OS. In the case of Symbian OS, ap-
plication signing seemed to be an appropriate measure for
slowing down malware appearance. Unfortunately, latest
examples showed that signing can be bypassed resulting in
new malware outbreak.
In this paper, we present a novel approach to static
malwaredetectioninresource-limited mobileenvironments.
This approach can be used to extend currently used third-
party application signing mechanisms for increasing mal-
ware detection capabilities. In our work, we extract func-
tion calls from binaries in order to apply our clustering
mechanism, called centroid. This method is capable of
detecting unknown malwares. Our results are promising
where the employed mechanism might ﬁnd application at
distribution channels, like online application stores. Addi-
tionally, it seems suitable for directly being used on smart-
phones for (pre-)checking installed applications.
1 Introduction
Our daily lives become more and more dependent upon
smartphones due to their increasing capabilities. Smart-
phones are used for various purposes including web brows-
ing or online payment. Thus, security threats to these de-
vices become more and more critical.
Malware writers started creating malware for smart-
phones in 2004, mainly targeting Symbian OS. Symbian in-
troduced mandatory application signing in version S60 3rd
in 20061 for coping with this problem. Application sign-
1First S60 3rd device shipped in March 2006 named Nokia 3250
ing was performed by third-party companies that checked
submitted applications for a certain set of requirements,
e.g. proper memory handling and certiﬁcate level. The
certiﬁcate basically grants access to different kinds of API
calls basing on the privilege level. The signing mechanism
turned out to prevent malware development for this plat-
form until the ﬁrst spyware for Symbian OS 3rd was pub-
lished [15]. After this spyware appearance it took almost
3 years until the ﬁrst malware for the 3rd version appeared
[6]. The reason for this is not obvious. On the one hand
one could argue that the market share of Symbian OS is
not as big as the one of MS Windows. On the other hand
the complexity of Symbian OS programming might distract
malware writers looking for ”fast” results. Therefore, we
can state that applying third-party application checking is a
good approach towards malware prevention while applied
mechanisms should consider more comprehensive checks
for detecting malware.
In this work, we apply static analysis of function calls
in order to detect malicious applications. This presents a
novel approach to static malware detection in mobile envi-
ronments and can extend third-party application checking
for increased application security. Additionally, not only
signing processes2 can beneﬁt from this approach: plat-
forms mainly using online application stores can also em-
ploy this type of analysis for detecting malicious software,
e.g. Android3 or iPhone4. These online stores require the
submission of the to be published application which is an
appropriate time for applying the analysis. In some cases
it is possible to bypass application stores for downloading
software. Therefore, we also consider the option of moving
these checks directly to the mobile device.
Basing on common clustering methods, we developed a
light-weight algorithm called centroid machine. This algo-
rithm is used for detecting, in particular, Symbian OS mal-
ware on the basis of function calls which sufﬁces the re-
2as known from Symbian OS
3http://code.google.com/android
4http://www.apple.com/iphone/quirements of mobile devices, e.g. efﬁciency, speed and
limited resource usage. The results of the centroid machine
are compared with the results of the light-weight Naive
Bayes classiﬁer [11] as well as with a heavy-weight sup-
port vector machine method. Our approach is not limited to
Symbian OS, but since this platform has the highest amount
of available malware among smartphone systems, we chose
it for validation purpose.
This work is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
present related work on static analysis for malware detec-
tion. In Section 3, we describe how we collected our data
set on which our work is basing on. Section 4 presents our
approach towards static analysis of Symbian OS function
calls for detecting malicious applications. In Section 6, we
conclude.
2 Related Work
Static analysis is a quite new ﬁeld for mobile malware
research, therefore most related publications still refer to
stationary systems, like PCs.
Wang et al. [16] observe the usage of DLL and API
methods for training support vector machines (SVM) for
behavior detection. Behavior-based approaches normally
suffer from a high false positive rate while needing a sig-
niﬁcant amount of processing power, storage, and memory.
The authors claim an accuracy of 99% but do not present
the corresponding detection rate which would help to rate
the quality of the results.
Egele et al. [5] describe a static analysis for PHP web ap-
plications checking the requests while considering the call
parameters for creating more precise detection models.
Christodorescu et al. [3] use static analysis for creat-
ing assembler-based program automatons for detecting ma-
licious activity using the disassembler IDA Pro. In partic-
ular, they address the problem of obfuscation which cur-
rent commercial anti-malware application still can not han-
dle properly. Their tool is called static analyzer for exe-
cutables (SAFE) and seems to be an appropriate approach
for handling malware through an stationary system. The
drawback is that on-device detection requires light-weight
methods complicating a possible transfer of the presented
approach to a limited mobile device.
Bayer et al. [1] present a tool named TTanalyze. This
tool is able to monitor Windows applications dynamically
by monitoring usage of system and API calls. The focus
of this work does not lie in the detection of malware, the
aim is to understand the malware behavior for decreasing
the window of vulnerability.
Bergeron et al. [2] perform a semantic analysis of binary
code. Their approach is separated into three stages: (1.)
creation of an intermediate representation, (2.) ﬂow-based
behavior analysis, and (3.) static veriﬁcation of critical be-
haviors against security policies. Flow-based analysis is a
valuable technique for investigating malware but currently
not suitable for smartphones due to resource constraints.
Kr¨ ugel et al. [7] use static analysis on binaries in order
to detect kernel-level rootkits via instruction sequences be-
fore corresponding modules get loaded into kernel. They
state that their prototype did not produce any false-positive
while detecting all tested rootkits. Additionally, the authors
refer to a problem caused by ”the exponential explosion of
possible paths that need to be followed” which clearly in-
dicates that currently, this approach cannot be applied to
smartphones. These path are created by creating states of
the observed machine for analysis of control ﬂows.
Provos [9] wrote a tool capable of generating and enforc-
ing policies concerning system calls. The “Systrace” tool
is intended to be efﬁcient and does not impose signiﬁcant
performance penalties while currently aiming for stationary
Linux/Unix systems.
Warrender et al. [17] compare sequences of system
calls in order to distinguish normal from abnormal behav-
ior. They test four methods with increasing complexity, e.g.
Hidden Markov Models (HMM) and come to the conclu-
sion that although HMM gives the best accuracy the less
complex ones are sufﬁcient. The problem remains that an-
alyzing call sequences is a complex task currently not suit-
able for smartphones.
Moser et al. [8] investigate the limits of static analy-
sis for malware detection. They state that using obfusca-
tion detection via static analysis can be evaded. Therefore,
static analysis should be extended by dynamic analysis. In
our case we belief that our approach is less vulnerable to
some of the mentioned obfuscation techniques. Consider-
ing changes in call sequences, our approach will ignore any
of these since simple statistics on function call occurrences
are checked.
Schmidt et al. [13] use system and library functions
for comparing malware with benign software on Android.
Using state-of-the-art classiﬁers resulted in high detection
rates with moderate false-positive rate. Since Android lacks
corresponding malwares, Linux malwares were ported to
this platform for building a source of malicious software.
Applicability was checked by comparing original source
code with ported source code where the results showed only
minor and ignorable differences.
3 Function Call Extraction from Symbian
OS Executables
Only few malwares are known for current Symbian OS
3rd. First malware targeting Symbian OS 3rd appeared in
February 2009 which used a valid certiﬁcate. This hap-pened shortly after Mulliner5 presented a way to bypass the
security mechanisms of Symbian OS 3rd at Black Hat Con-
ference 2008 in Japan. Mulliner additionally stated that he
was wondering why no one else was trying this common
approach earlier. These events suggest us that the number
of such malwares developed may increase substantially in
near future.
In this work, we consider using the former Symbian plat-
form version, namely Symbian OS 2nd, for beneﬁting from
the huge amount of existing malwares. Although these bi-
naries base on the older version of Symbian OS, we be-
lieve that the results of this work can also be applied to the
newer versions of Symbian OS. The main reason for this is
that from a function call perspective most of the calls re-
mained the same while some were removed and new ones
were added6.
Over 300 malwares appeared up to date for Symbian OS
2nd, [12]. We start by eliminating malwares which are
simple ﬁle containers (installers) overwriting critical ﬁles
and which are based on similar code bases sometimes only
changing the name of the installation ﬁle or the installation
note. After ﬁltering, we ended up with data sets consisting
of 33 Symbian OS 2nd malwares as well as on 49 popular
applications for the same version. 33 malwares obviously
do not form a statistically proof set but it is the only possi-
bility to work on real data for smartphone platforms. One
could argue that researching stationery systems can lead to
transferable solutions for smartphones. But key differences
between these systems have to be taken into account:
 Smartphone are highly connected while frequent con-
nection changes through different networks interfaces
are common, e.g. 2G, 2.5G, 3G, WiFi
 Smartphones are single-user systems in most cases
which allows to disregard aspects of multi-user sys-
tems.
 Most cellular networks use NAT to assign IP-
Addresses to cellular- and smartphones which de-
creases the possibility of attacking IP addresses di-
rectly.
 Smartphone operating systems allow to develop secu-
rity systems in a less complex environment.
 Although smartphones provide various functionality,
their main purpose is the usage of communication-
centric services, like phone, messaging, and nowadays
Internet applications.
5Security Researcher from Berlin, Germany
6http://wiki.forum.nokia.com/index.php/
Differences_between_S60_2nd_and_3rd_Edition
Table 1. Mapping of variables and functions
Variable Mapping
X database of executables
x executable

 union of function calls from all x 2 X
! function call in 

P(
) power set of 

Xb class of benign executables in X
Xm class of malicious executables in X
 most frequent calls from both Xm and Xb
 top 14 calls from 
^ m(!) frequency of attributes in Xm
^ b(!) frequency of attributes in Xb
^ b(!) standard deviation in Xb
 Most critical threats to smartphones are DoS attacks,
information stealing, and ﬁnancial service charge
abuse.
These aspects encourage us to stick to real malwares for
research. Ignoring research on such platform due to limited
data sets can result in millions of unprotected users.
We used IDA Pro7 for extracting the function calls.
Comprehensive tutorials can be found online as well as in
[4]. While exploring the installation binaries, we faced the
problem that not all could be ”unpacked” by IDA Pro. To
solve this problem we used a tool called ”UnSIS8” that was
able to give us access to the corresponding ﬁles. As an al-
ternative, the tool ”SISInfo9” can be used to do the same.
We state that our ﬁndings can be applied to mobile de-
vices. One drawback of this statement is of course that IDA
Pro is not available for any smartphone platform. But our
researchhasshownthatimplementingsimilarrelevantfunc-
tionality on current and future smartphone platforms will be
possible. In case of Android you can install the readelf 10
application which delivers detailed information on reloca-
tion and symbol tables of each ELF object ﬁle. Most inter-
estingly, it outputs the static list of referenced function calls
for each application chosen.
4 Static Function Call Analysis of Symbian
OS Soft- and Malware
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
When extracting function calls we only take into account






10http://unixhelp.ed.ac.uk/CGI/man-cgi?readelf+1Figure 1. The x-axis displays the percentage of malware, the y-axis displays the number of calls from

 which appear in the malware. The dotted line reveals that there are about 50 calls which appear in
70% of the malwares.
arguments. The set of all functions, appearing in at least
one of the executables in our database X, will be denoted by

, the elements of which are the attributes in our machine
learningapproach. Thestaticfunctioncallanalysisretrieves





x 7 ! (x); (1)
where P(
) is the power set of 
.
In this section we reveal some facts on the appearance
of function calls in the executables we analyzed and present
a descriptive statistic on the attribute distributions. In our
database we deal with 33 malicious and 49 benign pro-
grams. Overall, 3620 unique function calls where discov-
ered, where 254 of these only appeared in malware, i.e. they
are never called by any benign program. The graph in Fig-
ure 1 gives a rough overview on the attribute distribution
on the malware class. It reveals that there are almost 50
attributes in 
 which appear in 70% of the malware, and
about 40 which appear in the static analysis of 80% of the
malware. Note that the curve in Figure 1 declines steeply
beyond the 85% mark. Malware detection with a rate higher
than 90% is unreachable by simple methods, such as look-
ing at single attributes. The results from Figure 1 clearly
emphasize that despite of that we already ﬁltered out mal-
wares with similar code bases the other still remain simi-
lar. This underlines estimations that most Symbian OS mal-
wares base on a very small set of initial malware source
code.
Feature Extraction.
To make our detection system more efﬁcient it should only
be based on a subset of 
. Additionally, one should not rely
on single malware-speciﬁc calls since they may be replaced
or omitted in future. To increase robustness with respect to
such call replacements, one should take calls into account
which are standard and widely used, i.e. calls appearing
frequently in both malware and benign programs. The set of
thesecallswillbedenotedby. Somecharacteristicsofthe
most malware-typical calls in  are presented in Figure 2
and will be called . An attribute ! 2 
 is regarded as
more malware-typical the greater the quantity gets.
t(!) = ^ m(!)  
 
^ b(!) + 3^ b(!)

(2)
where ^ m(!) = 1
jXmj
P
x2Xm 1f!2(x)g is the frequency
of the attribute within the malware class Xm (for ‘1’ be-
ing the indicator function which equals 1 if the underscored








(1f!2(x)g   ^ b)2
the empirical standard deviation within the benign class Xb.
Three times  is chosen in (2) since it is a common empiri-
cal rule, meaning that for a real random variable almost allFigure 2. The x-axis shows the attributes of , the y-axis their appearance frequencies: black dis-
plays the frequency in benign programs (^ b(!)), light-gray the frequency in benign programs plus
three times standard deviation (^ b(!) + 3^ b(!)), dark-gray the frequency in malware (^ m(!)). The
longer the dark-gray bar gets, the higher the probability is that a program is malicious, premising
the call occurs in the static analysis.
values lie within 3 standard deviations of the mean [10]. As
our ﬁnal feature set , we picked attributes with the greatest
t(!) > 0 values and ! 2 .
4.2 Detecting Malware by Means of Ma-
chine Learning
With the simple statistical methods of the previous sec-
tion, detection rates of more than 90% can not be achieved.
In order to gain better detection precision and accuracy we
employ machine learning techniques. By applying appro-
priate models, we take the interdependencies of attributes
into account. We propose an algorithm called centroid ma-
chine, designed for detecting symbian malware on the basis
of function calls. This sufﬁces the requirements of mobile
devices, i.e. efﬁcient, fast and light-weight. Furthermore,
we compare the quality of centroid machine with a version
of a support vector machine and a naive Bayes classiﬁer
[11] since every simple classifying algorithm has to keep
pace with these state of the art approaches.
Deﬁnition of “Centroid Machine”.
The centroid machine classiﬁes an executable via cluster-
ing. Each cluster is deﬁned by a centroid, where the clusters
are called cm and cb for the malicious and benign classes
respectively. An executable is classiﬁed as malicious if its
closer to cm and benign if it is closer to cb. To make such
distance calculations possible, we have to map the set of
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(3)
for an ordered 
 = f!1;:::;!j
jg. The set Rj
j forms
a metric space with the euclidean distance d. After apply-
ing the attribute-extracting function  from (1), we attain
a kernel which operates directly on the set of executables
k = k. A centroid for a class j 2 f‘malicious’;‘benign’g
is chosen in a way that minimizes the sum of squared eu-







Then, our classiﬁer can be deﬁned as a map C assigning
each executable one of the classes cm or cb.
C : x 7 !

malicious; if d(k(x);cm) < d(k(x);cb)
benign; else.
(4)Table 2. Statistical ﬁgures characterizing the quality of different learning models, excerpt from a
10-fold cross-validation.
Model Malware Detection Rate Accuracy Attribute Set Attributes
Centroid Machine 0.9667 0.9875 
 3620
Centroid Machine 0.9505 0.9750  254
Centroid Machine 0.9333 0.9650  14
Naive Bayes 0.7890 0.9020  14
Binary SVM 0.9800 0.9194  14
Inordertovarythesensitivityweintroduce analarmthresh-




and classiﬁed as benign otherwise. This means with in-
creasing , probability increases that arbitrary checked ex-
ecutables will be detected as malicious. Figure 3 visualizes
the aforementioned classiﬁcation.














Figure 3. Example clusters of executables
with benign center of gravity cb and malicious
cm in relation to checked executable k(x).
For our statistical investigation we performed 1000 runs
of ten-fold cross-validation, where in each loop execution
the data is folded randomly into a training set containing
9=10-th of the data and a test set containing the remaining
one tenth. We applied the algorithms with different attribute
sets, which are the aforementioned 
, , and . As a rep-
resentative for support vector machine classiﬁers, we em-
ployed the implementation of Chang and Chih-Jen11 based
on the algorithm proposed by Scholkopf et al. [14] with
standard parameters. We also varied the SVM parameters,
but results did not improve signiﬁcantly. We used MatLab12
as learning environment.
11libsvm: a library for support vector machines, 2001, http://
www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/˜cjlin/libsvm
12MATLAB, The Language of Technical Computing,
R2008b, The MathWorks, Inc. http://www.mathworks.com
On Table 2, the averages of classiﬁcation rates are dis-
played. Note that centroid machine outperforms naive
Bayes and has even a better accuracy than the heavy-weight
support vector machine. Also note that the dramatic at-
tribute reduction from 3620 to only 14 is accompanied by
an acceptable decline of detection rate and accuracy. This
reveals the possibility to only take a relatively small subset
of 
 into account while keeping the discriminative potential
of the attribute set. This potential small subset of features
also allows moving detection logic to mobile devices while
not encumbering the devices signiﬁcantly. By varying the
alarm threshold  of the centroid machine in Formula 5 the
sensitivity varies. The resulting ROC-graph is depicted in
Figure 4 while the area under the curve is AUC = 0:9318.
ReferringtoFigure2, thefunctioncallsfrom13 pointto
Bluetooth-based calls giving a good indication for detecting
malware. Due to this numbers, we can additionally state
that most sophisticated14 Symbian OS malwares obviously
use at least Bluetooth for propagation.
Revisiting drawbacks considering static analysis as pre-
sented from Moser et al. [8], it is not trivial to estimate
the vulnerability of centroid to common obfuscation tech-
niques. Since direct usage of machine code is very uncom-
mon in Symbian OS applications15, appearance of related
initial function calls should be detected. Additionally, since
our approach only relies on the function calls themselves
and not call sequences, modiﬁcation on the sequences do
not harm our approach. The same applies for the Android
platform, while our estimations of course still need to be
validated.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We described a set of Symbian OS malware analyzed by
a clustering method called centroid. This clustering method
was validated with the analyzed malware set. Centroid is
based on a static function call analysis and distinguishes
13representing the intersected top 14 calls from Symbian OS mal- and
software
14being more sophisticated than malwares only overwriting ﬁles through
exploiting features from the Symbian OS installation system
15except driversFigure 4. ROC Curve for the centroid machine for varying alarm threshold  from (5). The area under
the curve is AUC = 0:9318.
malicious from benign program by a learning concept. Fur-
thermore, we compared its quality parameters with some
standard state-of-the-art learning algorithms and showed
that it is competitive. Additionally, it is having the advan-
tage of being lighter, which makes it more appropriate for
the requirements of a smartphone platform.
Moreover, we presented a attribute reduction method by
which we successfully reduced dimensionality dramatically
without signiﬁcant loss of detection quality. We will con-
tinue with investigations on following topics:
 Examine different methods for improving classiﬁers
for the requirements of mobile phone.
 Implement a ﬁrst prototype.
 Extend our analysis on benign programs to create
an malware detection system based on unsupervised
learning, capable to learn a concept of normality and
therefore capable to detect malware, which has been
unknown until now.
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